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ABSTRACT
In CBS Corporation v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit struck down the
Federal Communication Commission’s rules for protecting
confidential information that it collects during certain merger
proceedings. In response, the Commission released a new order,
pursuant to the Charter, Time Warner, and Bright House merger
proceeding, for protecting confidential information. This iBrief
analyzes the policy and legal implications of the Order, arguing
that the Order is unlawful because it violates the Trade Secrets
Act and notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements.

INTRODUCTION
The Communications Act of 1934 requires the Federal
Communications Commission to review every transfer of one of its
licenses. 1 Thus, Commission officials are inevitably interjected into
business transactions involving cell phone, landline, broadcast radio,
satellite radio, and cable companies—among others.2
When determining if it should grant a license transfer, the
Commission asks whether “public interest, convenience, and necessity
will be served” by the transaction. 3 As Jon Sallet, the Commission’s
General Counsel, has pointed out, the public interest standard goes
“beyond the traditional strictures of antitrust laws (most notably the
Clayton Act).”4 For instance, the Clayton Act instructs the Department of
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See generally, e.g., Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses XM Satellite
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Justice to challenge transactions that would “substantially lessen
competition.”5
In determining if transactions serve the public interest, the
Commission forces transacting parties 6 to supply it with confidential
information. Often a submitting party’s confidential information
necessarily implicates a third party. 7 Parties with an interest in the
transaction8 are allowed to review and comment on the merging parties’
confidential information, which—in theory—assists the Commission with
its public interest evaluation. 9 To protect the transacting parties’
confidential information, the Commission only makes certain information
available to reviewing parties’ after granting protective orders.10 But the
rules protecting confidential information are far from clear and recent
Commission orders and the D.C. Circuit case CBS Corporation v. FCC
have made the process murkier. Additionally, the Commission sometimes
leaks confidential information if it determines that the release is “in the
interest of the agency.”11 Thus, private parties like CBS or ESPN should
be unpersuaded that the Commission protects their confidential
information.

5

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
Transacting parties are referred to throughout this article as “submitting” or
“merging” parties.
7
A “third party” has a confidential interest in information submitted to the
Commission, but they are not a submitting party.
8
Parties with an interest in the transaction are referred to throughout this article
as “reviewing” or “commenting” parties.
9
See 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (2012) (“[N]o . . . application . . . shall be granted by the
Commission earlier than thirty days following issuance of public notice.”). This
review process has been challenged by many for being discriminatory. For
example, former senior technology advisor in President Obama’s administration,
Phil Weiser, has remarked that the “FCC sometimes uses such proceedings to
decide issues that are otherwise pending in industry rulemakings—leading to one
set of rules for those who have merged and another set of rules for similarly
situated parties who have not.” Phil Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform,
and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State 36 (Univ. Colo. Law Sch. Legal
Studies Research Paper Series), http://tiny.cc/ksaf5x.
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30 FCC Rcd. 10360, 10365 (Sept. 11, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
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See Mario Trujillo, Inspector General Investigating FCC Leaks, THE HILL
(May 6, 2016, 9:38 AM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/278978inspector-general-investigating-fcc-leaks (discussing two Commission leaks).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. An Ambiguous Beginning: The Commission’s First Procedures
for Protecting Confidential Information
The Commission first released a comprehensive framework for
protecting confidential information and issuing protective orders in its
1998 Confidential Information Statement.12 The statement makes it clear
that under section 0.457(d) of the Commission’s rules 13 —a provision
implementing part of the Freedom of Information Act— certain trade
secrets or “Exemption 4 Materials” 14 are not to be made routinely
available for public inspection. 15 The statement requires there to be a
“persuasive showing” why confidential information is necessary to the
review process before the information is publicly disclosed.16 To meet the
persuasive showing standard, the Commission must identify a
“compelling public interest” in favor of disclosure. 17 The Commission
also “balanc[es] . . . the interests favoring disclosure and non-disclosure.”18
The availability of protective orders is one factor the Commission
considers when engaging in this balancing.19
The Commission used the rules set forth in the Confidential
Information Statement from 1998 to 2014.20 However, the statement is
unclear about two material issues: First, it is unclear if issuing a protective
order qualifies as a public disclosure. 21 Second, the Commission’s
definition of what constitutes necessary information within the persuasive
showing framework is vague and possibly contradictory: In one instance
12

Current Policy Concerning Treatment of Confidential Info., 13 FCC Rcd.
24816 (July 28, 1998) [hereinafter Confidential Information Statement].
13
47 C.F.R. § 0.457 (2016).
14
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012) (Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act
protects “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained [by the
government] from a person [that is] privileged or confidential.”).
15
See Confidential Information Statement, supra note 12, at 24818–19.
16
Id. at 24822 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 0.461).
17
Id. at 24822–23.
18
Id. at 24822 (reasoning that the Supreme Court contemplated this in FCC v.
Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1965)).
19
See id. at 24824 (discussing the Commission’s reliance on protective orders
when determining whether or not to disclose the confidential information).
20
The Commission’s bureaus issued many protective orders between 1998 and
2014 pursuant to the Confidential Information Statement. See, e.g., News Corp.
& DirecTV Grp., Inc. & Liberty Media Corp. for Authority To Transfer Control,
22 FCC Rcd. 12797, 12797 (July 10, 2007).
21
See id. at 24831 (reasoning that “protective orders can . . . permit[] limited
disclosure for a specific public purpose” (emphasis added)).
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the Confidential Information Statement states that the Commission “insists
upon a showing that the information is a necessary link in a chain of
evidence that will resolve an issue before the Commission” before the
information will be released.22 In another instance, the statement states that
information does not need to be “‘vital’ to the conduct of a proceeding,
necessary to the ‘fundamental integrity’ of the Commission process at
issue, or . . . have a direct impact on the requestor.”23

B. The D.C. Circuit Strikes Down The FCC’s Most Recent Order
Protecting Confidential Information
In 2014, the Commission considered two proposed mergers:
AT&T sought to merge with DirecTV—in a transaction ultimately
approved—and Comcast sought to merge with Time Warner Cable and
Charter Communications—in a transaction that was ultimately
withdrawn.24 In line with past practices and the Confidential Information
Statement, the Commission in April released a protective order (April
Order) for the transaction.25 Third parties like CBS and Viacom, who had
their confidential information submitted to the Commission by the
merging parties, challenged the April Order because they did not want
their proprietary information disclosed during the merger-review
process.26
In response to the third parties’ challenges, a division of the
Commission called the Media Bureau sought public comment for new
protective order procedures.27 In response to those comments, the Media
Bureau released new rules (October Order) governing protective orders.28
The October Order provided content companies more protection than the
April Order.29 It “prevented disclosure of confidential information ‘until
any objection is resolved by the Commission and, if appropriate by [a]
court.’” 30 The order also allowed third parties to object to parties who
compete with them reviewing their confidential information, instead of

22

Id. at 24822–23.
Id. at 24829.
24
See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 785 F.3d 699, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
25
See id. at 702.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See id. (reasoning that more protection was established by a guarantee of
judicial review for all disclosure decisions).
30
Id.
23

43

UNPROTECTED AND UNPERSUADED

[Vol. 15

just parties who compete with the merger applicants. 31 Despite these
reasonable safeguards, the October Order was short lived.32
In November, the Media Bureau reconsidered the October Order,
and released the Amended Protective Order. 33 This order truncated
protections for third parties.34 Then the Commission, in a 3-2 vote, denied
the content companies’ Application for Review of the Media Bureau’s
Amended Protective Order.35
The content companies then sued the Commission claiming that
the Amended Protective Order was unlawful because the Commission
does not have the legal authority to disclose their confidential information
and because the Amended Protective Order’s truncated judicial review
process was procedurally and substantively unlawful.36 The D.C. Circuit
addressed these issues in CBS Corporation v. FCC.37
First, the court addresses whether the “persuasive showing
standard” applies to information released pursuant to a protective order.38
The court “assumes” that the standard applies because the Amended
Protective Order specified that it applies and the Commission’s attorney
in oral arguments conceded that it applies.39
Second, the D.C. Circuit addresses what the persuasive showing
standard entails. The court relies on the Confidential Information
Statement.40 The statement is clear that disclosure must be in the public
interest and it must be a good idea on balance,41 but it is unclear about how
“necessary” information must be for the review process before the

31

Id.
Id. at 703.
33
Id.
34
See id. at 702–03 (discussing how the Amended Protective Order eliminated
judicial review of certain Commission decisions and gave submitting parties less
time to object to the release of information).
35
Id. at 703.
36
See id. (explaining that third parties opposed the Amended Protective Order
because, among other reasons, it was inconsistent with past agency practices).
37
Id. at 699.
38
See id. at 704 (addressing whether the persuasive showing standard applies
because 47 C.F.R § 0.457 (2016) states that “a persuasive showing as to the
reasons for inspection will be required in requests for inspection,” and in CBS
there was no requestor—rather, the Commission was attempting to disclose
information on its own initiative).
39
Id. at 704.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 705.
32
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Commission may release it.42 It states—ambiguously—that information
must be a “necessary link in a chain of evidence” to be released, but that
information does not need to be “‘vital’ to the conduct of a proceeding” to
be released.43 Analyzing the Confidential Information Statement, the court
held that the Commission’s “necessary-link finding is an unavoidable
component of the persuasive showing.”44 To sum up the court’s holding:
to release confidential information “the Commission must explain (1) why
disclosure is in the public interest, (2) why it is a good idea on balance,
and (3) why the information serves as a ‘necessary link in a chain of
evidence.’”45
The Amended Protective Order satisfied the first two criteria, but
did not satisfy the third criterion. 46 The Confidential Information
Statement gave the Commission authority to release information “central”
to the proceeding.47 But, pursuant to the Amended Protective Order, the
Commission may only release information if it is “absolutely needed” or
“required,” which is a stricter standard.48
The court noted that the Commission could clarify or amend its
current policy.49 But the court indicated that the persuasive showing must
still apply.50 In other words, the Commission’s rules must encompass the
persuasive showing standard, but the Commission could still clarify what
that standard entails.51
The court also held that the Amended Protective Order’s truncated
judicial review process is unlawful because it amounts to a “substantive
and important departure from prior Commission precedent.”52 The order
only gives parties five days to challenge the Bureau’s decision, and
information is released before the FCC Commissioners or a court may
See id. at 706 (discussing the wide range of definitions of the word “necessary,”
including anywhere from “relevant” or “central” to “absolutely needed” or
“required”).
43
See Confidential Information Statement, supra note 12, at 24829.
44
CBS, 785 F.3d at 705.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 705–06.
47
Id. at 706.
48
Id. (supporting its holding by relying on the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1905 (2012), and its decision in Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. FCC, 229 F.3d
1172, 1180–84 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
49
Id. at 708.
50
See id. (reasoning that the persuasive showing standard may be amended or
clarified—not scrapped).
51
See id.
52
Id.
42
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prevent its release.53 Previously, parties had more time to object to the
release of information, and information would not be released until the full
Commission or a court reviewed all timely objections.54 Since the order
does not provide any reasoned analysis for this departure, the court held it
to be unlawful.55
For the above reasons, the court vacated the Amended Protective
Order.56 In response, the full Commission without notice-and-comment
rulemaking, in a controversial 3-2 vote, adopted a new order (Order) on
September 2, 2015 detailing the rules for all protective orders.57

II. THE ORDER
A. Description of the Order
The Order states that the Commission has the authority to release
information during licensing proceedings to reviewing parties pursuant to
protective orders.58 It details a new process for parties objecting to the
release of information.59 And it purports to clarify certain rules for the
release of information without protective orders.60 These rules applied to
the Time Warner, Charter, and Bright House proceeding, and they will
apply to all future proceedings, but the Commission has delegated
authority to its various Bureaus to modify the exact scope of future
orders.61
The Commission believes its authority to release confidential
information pursuant to protective orders is well-established.62 According
to the Commission, the Supreme Court in FCC v. Schreiber63 held that

53

Id.
Id. at 708–10.
55
Id. The court also indicated that there might be substantive concerns with the
five-day rule even if the Commission provided a reasoned analysis for it. Id. at
710.
56
Id.
57
Order, supra note 10.
58
Id. at 10365–72.
59
Id. at 10373–77.
60
Id. at 10378–86.
61
See id. at 10378. Any significant change to these rules would presumably need
full Commission approval. Moreover, the objection process may not be changed
by the bureaus. Id. at 10376 n.97.
62
Id. at 10365–66.
63
FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289, 291–92 (1965).
54
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section 4(j) of the Communications Act 64 permits the Commission to
release confidential information without violating the Trade Secrets Act.65
The Order states that the “persuasive showing standard” does not
apply to information released pursuant to protective orders. 66 The
Commission reasons that this standard is only applicable when
information is released publicly, and information released pursuant to a
protective order does not qualify as a public release.67 Because it decides
that the persuasive showing standard is inapplicable, the information does
not have to be “necessary.”68
All information in the record may be reviewed pursuant to a
protective order, no matter how sensitive it is to a transacting party or a
third party.69 There are no limits on the number of people who may review
information under a protective order.70
The Order does provide some protections: reviewing individuals
must not be involved in “competitive decision-making” or be “in a
business relationship with the party whose confidential information is at
issue.”71 Reviewing individuals must have an interest in the proceeding or
represent a party that has an interest in the proceeding. 72 Reviewing
individuals may only use the confidential information for commenting in
47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (2012) (“The Commission may conduct its proceedings in
such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the
ends of justice.”).
65
Order, supra note 10, at 10365–66, 10366 n.41 (reasoning that the Trade
Secrets Act only permits the release of information “authorized by law” and
section 4(j) is such authorization); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012) (“Whoever,
being an officer or employee of the United States . . . publishes, divulges,
discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law
any information coming to him in the course of his employment . . . shall be fined
under this title, or imprisoned . . . .”).
66
Order, supra note 10, at 10384–86.
67
Id. at 10369 & n.65.
68
Id.
69
See id. at 10369, 10371 n.76 (stating that previously the Commission gave extra
protections to certain extremely confidential information, but that, because
protective orders provide sufficient protection, extra protection is not needed for
any information no matter its sensitivity).
70
Id. at 10371. Moreover, the Order exempts support personnel of lawyers and
consultants from having to sign acknowledgements of a protective order’s rules.
The reviewing parties still must sign acknowledgments that they are complying
with Commission rules. Id. at 10377.
71
Id. at 10371.
72
Id. Presumably, any person or organization could become a party in a
proceeding if they claimed to be interested in the result of the transaction.
64

47

UNPROTECTED AND UNPERSUADED

[Vol. 15

the current proceeding.73 Sanctions and criminal penalties may be imposed
on certain individuals for violating the terms of a protective order.74 The
Order states that these protections “are more than sufficient to protect even
highly competitively sensitive information” from being leaked.75
The Order restores submitting parties and third parties’ previously
truncated rights to object to an individual reviewing their confidential
information.76 Although all the information in the record is available to a
reviewing party,77 the Order permits submitting parties to object to the
release of specific information in the record to all parties,78 but only in
“extraordinary” circumstances will the Commission grant such a request.79
The Order also “allow[s] third parties who have an interest in the
confidential information to raise objections to [r]eviewing [p]arties.”
Previously, only submitting parties could object to specific individuals
reviewing their information.80
Also, information is no longer released until the Commission or a
court has resolved an objection. 81 The objection process is the same
whether or not a party is objecting to a blanket release of information or
to the release of information to a specific reviewing individual. 82 The
merging party—or the submitting party—has ten business days to object
to its release, and a third party must object “as soon as practical.”83 If the
Bureau overrules either objection, the parties have ten days to ask the full
Commission to review the Bureau’s decision, and in that time no
information will be released. 84 If this application for review is denied,
parties have ten days to file a request for a judicial stay of the information’s
release.85
Finally, the Order details the rules for the release of information
not pursuant to a protective order (so called “public release”). The
73

Id. at 10367–68.
Id.
75
Id. at 10371.
76
Id. at 10374–77.
77
Id. at 10369.
78
Id. at 10373–74.
79
Id. at 10374–75.
80
Id. Third parties could not object at all and submitting parties could not object
to the blanket release of any information. Id.
81
Id. at 10375.
82
See id. at 10373–74, 10376 (setting forth that both processes are modeled off
Freedom of Information Act regulations).
83
Id. at 10374.
84
Id.
85
Id.
74
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Commission claims it is clarifying its existing rules and not promulgating
a new rule.86 To access confidential information, a requestor must make a
“persuasive showing.” 87 A persuasive showing is made only if, after
balancing various interests, the requestor shows that public disclosure
serves the public interest.88 The Order states that information does not
need to be “absolutely needed” or “required.”89 Furthermore, it states that
Commission rules never required information to be absolutely needed
after 1998, but to the extent they did, Commission rules are now
changed.90

B. The Dissenters
Two Commissioners vigorously dissented to the Order. 91 The
dissenters have two legal criticisms and some policy concerns. One legal
criticism is that, unlike the Confidential Information Statement, the Order
was promulgated without satisfying notice-and-comment requirements.92
A corollary to this critique is that the Order amounts to a substantive rule
change.93 This dissenters have this concern because the Commission has
abandoned the persuasive showing standard for protective orders and the
necessary link test for the persuasive showing standard.94
The other legal concern is that section 4(j) of the Communications
Act does not give the Commission the authority to publicly release
information.95 According to Commissioner Pai, after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,96 the Commission does not have the
authority to disclose trade secrets under general housekeeping statutes.97

86

See id. at 10378–79 (clarifying the proper meaning of persuasive showing in
light of CBS Corp. v. FCC, 785 F.3d 699 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
87
Id. at 10379.
88
See id. at 10379–80.
89
Id. at 10380–81; contra CBS, 785 F.3d at 706.
90
Order, supra note 10, at 10380–81.
91
See id. at 10397 (Pai, Comm’r, approving in part and dissenting in part)
(dissenting against all parts of the Order except for its objection procedures); id.
at 10404 (O’Reilly, Comm’r, dissenting) (dissenting against all parts of the
Order).
92
Id. at 10398 (Pai, Comm’r, approving in part and dissenting in part); see also
id. at 10404 (O’Reilly, Comm’r, dissenting).
93
See id. at 10398 (Pai, Comm’r, approving in part and dissenting in part).
94
See id. at 10399–10401.
95
Id. at 10402–03.
96
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
97
Order, supra note 10, at 10402–03 (Pai, Comm’r, approving in part and
dissenting in part).
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He reasons that (4)(j) is a general housekeeping statute when read in
context, so the Commission has no authority pursuant to it.98
Moreover, for policy reasons, the dissenting Commissioners are
concerned that too much competitively sensitive information will be
released pursuant to protective orders. 99 Commissioner O’Rielly in
particular believes protective orders are inadequate to prevent confidential
information from being publicly disclosed.100

III. POLICY EVALUATION AND CRITICISMS
The Order is a mixed bag from the perspective of third parties. It
protects third parties’ confidential information better than the Amended
Protective Order, but the Order should not have dropped the persuasive
showing standard.

A. An Improved Objection Process
The Order benefits third parties and submitting parties because
their confidential information is not released until after the full
Commission or a court reviews an objection, and because the parties may
object to having certain confidential information released to anyone. They
may also object to having all confidential information released to a specific
reviewing individual. Pursuant to the Amended Protective Order, a Bureau
would release information before the full Commission had a chance to
review an objection or before a court at the opportunity to issue a stay
order. The CBS court invalidated this process for procedural reasons and
questioned it for substantive reasons.101 In response to the CBS court’s
decision, the Commission promulgated the Order, which provides
submitting parties and third parties the right to seek a judicial stay and a
Commission review of Bureau decisions before the Bureau releases any
confidential information.
Moreover, the Order’s objection process is certainly fair for
submitting parties. They have ten days to challenge confidential
information’s release, which is ample time.102

98

Id.
Id.
100
See id. at 10405 (O’Rielly, Comm’r, dissenting) (railing that there is a
“profound misunderstanding of the sensitive nature of some of this material,
which will be now be exposed under inconsequential and ineffective protections,”
calling the Commission “hopelessly naïve,” and arguing that a reviewer may not
“unremember” information).
101
CBS Corp. v, FCC, 785 F.3d 699, 709–10 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
102
Order, supra note 10, at 10374.
99
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Third parties, in contrast to submitting parties, must challenge the
release of confidential information “as soon as practical.”103 There is an
obvious concern that a Bureau may release information before it is
“practical” for a third party to object to that information’s release—for
example, if a third party is never made aware that its confidential
information is going to be released, it never would have an opportunity to
object to such information’s release.
The Order’s attached Protective Order that governed the
submission of information for the Time Warner, Charter, and Bright
House transaction provides a solution to this problem: before a submitting
party submits its information to the Commission, it “shall notify any
known Third-Party Interest Holders who have a confidentiality
interest.” 104 Insofar as the Bureau includes this language in all future
proceedings, third parties will be protected. However, because this
requirement is not contained in the Order, third parties should be diligent
in safeguarding their interests.
Moreover, according to the Protective Order, copies of the
reviewer’s Acknowledgement are to be delivered to submitting parties and
to known third parties at least five days before the reviewing party
accesses any confidential information.105 Assuming that this protection—
which is not contained in the Order—is contained in future protective
orders,106 parties should be protected from reviewers with adverse interests
to them accessing their highly sensitive information. This is because
parties are put on notice by the Acknowledgement.
Another concern is that the Order, in practice, will not provide
parties with the ability to object to the release of specific information to
all reviewers, although the Order purports to provide parties this ability.
The Order states that the Commission expects that only in an
“extraordinary” situation would information be precluded from release to
all reviewers. 107 The Order highlights that a national security situation
might qualify as an extraordinary circumstance.108 Based on this language,
it seems like most—if not all—of these objections will be denied by the
Bureaus.

103

Id.
Id. at 10387 (protective order) [hereinafter Protective Order].
105
Id. at 10390–91.
106
The Order does state that all future protective orders must contain the same
objection process. One ambiguity is whether third parties are required to be
notified pursuant to all future protective orders. See Order, supra note 10, at
10378 & n.107.
107
Id. at 10373.
108
Id. at 10369 n.63.
104
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As a result, merging parties and third parties are, in effect, limited
to objecting to an individual’s review of their confidential information. If
they object to every individual reviewing their information on a case-bycase basis, they are probably more likely to succeed than if they object to
certain information being released to all reviewers.

B. The Unfortunate Dropping of the Persuasive Showing Standard
for Protective Orders
The Order’s biggest disadvantage to third parties is that the
persuasive showing standard does not apply to protective orders.109 This is
inconsistent with how the D.C. Circuit previously interpreted Commission
precedent and the Commission’s attorney’s statement at oral arguments in
CBS v. FCC.110 As mentioned previously, the Commission reasons that
the persuasive showing standard only applies to the public release of
confidential information, and it reasons that information released pursuant
to a protective order is not to be publicly released. Because the persuasive
showing standard is inapplicable, the necessary link component is also
inapplicable to protective orders.
Transacting parties must give the Commission all information the
Commission deems to be “relevant.” 111 “[A]ll of the information
submitted to the record” will be available to reviewers pursuant to a
protective order. So, as a result of this Order, any and every piece of
confidential information that a Bureau staffer deems relevant to a
transaction is available to any reviewing party. Thus, for example,
Comcast representatives could have easily reviewed Time Warner’s secret
contract with ESPN without justifying the need for that information. This
is a gross intrusion on corporate privacy, and is unnecessary for the
Commission’s public interest evaluation. The Commission did not need to
know what Comcast thinks about Time Warner’s ESPN contract to
evaluate Time Warner’s proposed merger.
To be sure, there are some limitations on who may access this
confidential information. But the telecommunications world is very
small. 112 The same players represent businesses time and time again
during Commission proceedings and there is no way for them to
“unremember” confidential secrets. 113 The Commission is naïve in
109

Id. at 10384.
See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 785 F.3d 699, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating how the
Commission’s attorney at oral arguments conceded that the persuasive showing
applies to protective orders).
111
Order, supra note 10, at 10369.
112
Id. at 10405 (O’Rielly, Comm’r, dissenting).
113
Id.
110
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thinking that sign-in disclosures, acknowledgement forms, professional
sanctions, and a few other light measures will be enough to prevent the
disclosure of confidential information outside the bounds of protective
orders.
Additionally, “private information from the FCC regularly
leaks.” For example, the Senate Commerce Chairman has investigated
whether the Commission leaked information about a budget for the
Lifeline program to scuttle a bipartisan deal. 115 Even the fact that the
Commission Chairman Tom Wheeler had decided to circulate an order to
approve the Charter, Time Warner, and Bright House transaction was
leaked before Commissioners voted on the deal. 116 Businesses with
confidential information being released pursuant to protective orders
should be concerned that their information is getting leaked as well.
114

C. Public Release Protections are Eviscerated
Transacting parties and third parties are damaged by the
Commission’s interpretation of the persuasive showing standard for the
public release of information. In contrast to confidential information
released pursuant to a protective order, the Order states that the requesting
party must make a persuasive showing for information to be released
publicly.117 In interpreting the Confidential Information Statement,118 the
Commission now declares that a requesting party does not need to prove
that the confidential information it requests is “absolutely needed” or
“required.”119
The standard for release of information is extremely ambiguous:
the Commission balances and weighs various “factors” and public and
private “interests” to determine if “disclosing the confidential information
serves the public interest.”120 At least the Order states that “[t]here must
be more than a ‘mere chance’ the confidential information will be helpful
and it must provide more than ‘factual content.’”121
Transacting parties who are forced to submit confidential
information to the Commission or third parties implicated in information
submitted to the Commission are left with little to no protection. Instead,
they rely on Commission staffers using opaque standards to weigh
114
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interests about whether public release is appropriate. And the Chairman of
the Commission maintains that “he has broad authority to release
nonpublic information unilaterally,” so confidential business information
may not be safe.122

IV. LEGAL CRITICISMS
The Order raises two distinct legal issues: First, does the
Commission have the authority to release confidential information
pursuant to a protective order? Second, did the Commission unlawfully
change its rules without notice-and-comment rulemaking by modifying
the persuasive showing standard?

A. The Order Likely Violates the Trade Secrets Act
The Trade Secrets Act prohibits government agencies from
disclosing confidential business information unless it is “authorized by
law” to do so.123 The Commission finds its authorization in section (4)(j)
of the Communications Act 124 and in the Supreme Court case FCC v.
Schreiber, where the Court held that (4)(j) “authorize[s] public disclosure
of information . . . as the agency may determine to be proper,” 125 —
although Schreiber never mentions the Trade Secrets Act.126 Regardless,
insofar as Schreiber authorizes the Commission to release confidential
information without violating the Trade Secrets Act, a later Supreme Court
case casts doubts on that authority.
The Court in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown held that internal
housekeeping statutes do not provide an agency with authorization to
release confidential information under the Trade Secrets Act. 127 An
internal housekeeping statute deals with matters of “agency organization,
procedure, or practice[,]” and such a statute does not authorize an agency
to release information publicly.128 To determine an agency’s authority, the
test is whether the text or history of the statute “indicates it is a substantive
grant of legislative power to promulgate rules authorizing the release of
trade secrets or confidential information.”129 Chrysler—as a later case—
122
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supersedes Schreiber if section (4)(j) qualifies as an internal housekeeping
statute.
So, is section (4)(j) an internal housekeeping statute? The statute
clearly governs the Commission’s internal affairs—especially since the
statute’s language has remained the same since 1934.130
The Commission may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will
best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of
justice . . . Any party may appear before the Commission and be heard
in person or by attorney. Every vote and official act of the
Commission shall be entered of record, and its proceedings shall be
public upon the request of any party interested.131

Moreover, section (4)(j) is surrounded by obvious housekeeping
statutes. For example, section (4)(h) explains “three members of the
Commission constitute a quorum.”132 And section (4)(k) mandates that the
Commission submit annual reports to Congress.133 It is very unlikely that
Congress intended to confer upon the Commission substantive authority
to release extremely competitively sensitive information in between
mundane, internal affairs provisions.134
The Commission’s justification for releasing information pursuant
to 4(j) is bizarre. It cites Schreiber and states: “Section 4(j) does not merely
confer power to promulgate rules generally applicable to all Commission
proceedings; it also delegates broad discretion to prescribe rules for
specific investigations, and to make ad hoc procedural rulings in specific
instances.”
It then cites Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 13 FCC Rcd 3602,
3608 ¶ 19 (1997), a Commission order, and states that “[w]e have the
authority, when addressing request for confidentiality, to impose or
modify protective orders on a case-by-case basis as circumstances
dictate.”135 None of its purported justifications for releasing information
discuss why 4(j) is not an internal housekeeping statute.
The closest the Commission gets to addressing the issue is by
stating that “section (4)(j) is different from the internal housekeeping
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statute at issue in Chrysler.” 136 To be sure, the two “statutes” are
different—this is a truism if there ever was one. 137 But they are both
internal statutes.
In sum, because section (4)(j) is an internal statute, the
Commission likely lacks the statutory authority to publicly release
confidential information pursuant to it.

B. The Order Likely Violates the APA’s Notice and Comment
Requirements
Unlike when it adopted the Confidential Information Statement,
the Commission did not use notice-and-comment rulemaking to
promulgate the Order. Importantly, the Commission claims that it is
“clarifying,” rather than “amending,” its regulations. 138 If the Order is
irreconcilable with the Confidential Information Statement, the Order was
required to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.139 It also must go
through notice-and-comment procedures if it “effects a substantive change
in existing . . . policy.” 140 In contrast, the Order does not need to go
through notice-and-comment rulemaking if it qualifies as an
“interpretative rule” that merely “describes the [Commission’s] view of
the meaning of [its] existing . . . regulation[s].”141
Two of the Order’s “clarifications” arguably qualify as
substantive changes to existing policy. First, it states that the persuasive
showing standard does not apply to confidential information released
pursuant to a protective order; it only applies when information is released
publicly without a protective order. Second, it states that the “necessary
link in a chain of evidence” test is not a component of the persuasive
showing standard.
It is crucial to this analysis to determine what the Commission’s
rules were prior to the Order. And as previously mentioned, the
Confidential Information Statement is somewhat unclear. However, on
balance, it appears that the Confidential Information Statement stated that
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the persuasive showing standard applies to protective orders and makes
the necessary link a component of the persuasive showing standard.142
1. Persuasive Showing Standard
The Confidential Information Statement, clearly states that a
persuasive showing must be made when Exemption 4 material is
disclosed.143 The Confidential Information Statement then states that “the
rules also contemplate [that] the Commission will engage in a balancing
of the interests favoring disclosure and non-disclosure.” 144 In the
subsequent paragraph, the Commission explains that it relies on
“protective orders to balance the interests in disclosure and the interests in
preserving the confidentiality of competitively sensitive information.”145
Quite clearly, the benefits and disadvantages of protective orders are to be
considered by the Commission when it balances interests. And the
Commission must balance interests in addition to determining whether a
persuasive showing has been made. So the obvious conclusion is that the
persuasive showing standard applies to protective orders in the
Confidential Information Statement.
Moreover, this conclusion is supported by the Amended Protective
Order.146 The Commission wrote that its “rules permit the disclosure of
such information on a ‘persuasive showing’ of the reasons in favor of its
release.” 147 In addition to the persuasive showing standard, the
Commission also “balances . . . the interests favoring disclosure and
nondisclosure.” 148 As a part of this balancing, the Commission has
historically “relied on special instruments, such as protective orders, to
serve the interests in disclosure while preserving the confidentiality of
competitively sensitive materials, rather than excluding relevant
documents from the record.”149 Clearly the persuasive showing standard
historically applied to the Commission’s protective orders.
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Additionally, in CBS v. FCC150 the D.C. Circuit151 reasoned that
the persuasive showing standard applies to protective orders. To be sure,
the court only assumed the standard applies152 because under Commission
regulations “[a] persuasive showing as to the reasons for inspection will
be required in requests . . . for inspection of such materials.”153 Under the
CBS facts, however, there was no requestor according to the court, because
the Commission was releasing information on its own initiative.154 Thus,
the court only assumed that the Commission must make a persuasive
showing as if it was the party requesting the information. 155 The court
came to this conclusion in light of Commission precedent as well as the
Commission’s lawyer acknowledging at oral arguments that the
persuasive showing standard applies to information released pursuant to
protective orders.156
In light of the Confidential Information Statement, the Amended
Protective Order, and the CBS holding, it seems clear that the persuasive
showing was a Commission requirement prior to the Order. Removing this
requirement qualifies as a “substantive change in existing policy.”157 Thus,
the Order likely required notice-and-comment rulemaking to be lawful,
and that never occurred. If the Order is challenged, it would likely be
struck down for violating notice-and-comment requirements.
2. Necessary Link Test
The necessary link test appears to be a part of longstanding
Commission policy. No parties dispute that prior to the Confidential
Information Statement the necessary link test was a part of the
Commission’s review process. 158 The question is whether the
Confidentiality Information Statement scraps this test.
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The Confidentiality Information Statement states that—as part of
the persuasive showing standard—“the Commission has adhered to a
policy of . . . ‘insist[ing] upon a showing that the information is a necessary
link in a chain of evidence’ that will resolve an issue before the
Commission.159 Crucially, this statement is in the past tense. It is unclear
if it is simply describing what the Commission has done or if it is
articulating the past and future rule. Future passages in the statement
clarify this somewhat.
The statement asserts that the persuasive showing standard is
retained.160 Thus, it seems to state that the standard is retained in its current
form, which would include the necessary link test. But the Confidentiality
Information Statement’s subsequent sentences cast doubt on this
conclusion. The Commission states that information does not need to be
“‘vital’ to the conduct of a proceeding, necessary to the ‘fundamental
integrity’ of the Commission process at issue, or . . . have a direct impact
on the requestor.”161
The CBS court held that the “necessary-link finding is an
unavoidable component of the persuasive showing the regulations
require.” 162 The court held that the Commission treated the language
preceding the necessary link test in the Confidential Information Statement
as binding and not just as a statement of past Commission policy, so the
necessary link test must also be binding.163 This is far from persuasive, but
it is the best possible analysis of the Confidential Information Statement.
This interpretation is plausible only if there is a difference
between information being part of a necessary link in the chain of evidence
to resolve issues before the Commission and information being vital to the
proceeding. Here, there is a difference.
Not every issue before the Commission is vital. Certain
information may be necessary to resolve some issue before the
Commission, but the Commission could still approve or deny a merger
without resolving the issue. For example, although it might be material to
the Commission to seek comment on information about Time Warner and
Charter’s contracts with ESPN, surely this is not vital to the Commission’s
determination if the transaction serves the public interest. So by not
mandating that information be vital, the Commission was simply refusing
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to implement a more stringent standard as a part of the necessary link test;
they did not remove the test.
In sum, because the Commission removed the necessary link test
in the Order from its rule governing the release of confidential information
without notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Order is likely procedurally
unlawful.
To be sure, the Commission—insofar as it has the statutory
authority to release highly confidential information pursuant to protective
orders—probably has the authority to drop the persuasive showing
standard from protective orders and alter or remove the necessary link test,
but it does not have the authority to do so without a notice-and-comment
rulemaking.

CONCLUSION
From the perspective of merging parties and third parties, there
are some good aspects of the Order. Chiefly, they have more rights to
object to information release and now a Bureau will not release
information until an objection is resolved by the full Commission or a
court. Regrettably, too much information is available to reviewing parties
and confidential information will likely leak. Moreover, the Order likely
violates the Trade Secrets Act and the Administrative Procedure Act’s
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement. If a party decides to
challenge the Order, which might not happen because it is not always wise
for businesses to litigate with a body that will continue to regulate it, a
court will likely strike down the Order for one or both of these reasons.

